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Abstract
Attribute-based access control (ABAC) provides a high level of flexibility that promotes security and
information sharing. ABAC policy mining algorithms have potential to significantly reduce the cost
of migration to ABAC, by partially automating the development of an ABAC policy from information
about the existing access-control policy and attribute data. This paper presents an algorithm for mining
ABAC policies from operation logs and attribute data. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first
algorithm for this problem.
1 Introduction
ABAC is becoming increasingly important as security policies become more dynamic and more complex. In
industry, more and more products support ABAC, using a standardized ABAC language such as XACML
[XAC] or a vendor-specific ABAC language. In government, the Federal Chief Information Officer Council
called out ABAC as a recommended access control model [Fed11, HFK+13]. ABAC allows “an unprecedented
amount of flexibility and security while promoting information sharing between diverse and often disparate
organizations” [HFK+13]. ABAC overcomes some of the problems associated with RBAC, notably role
explosion [HFK+13], which makes RBAC policies large and hard to manage.
ABAC promises long-term cost savings through reduced management effort, but manual development
of an initial policy can be difficult [BM13] and expensive [HFK+13]. Policy mining algorithms promise to
drastically reduce the cost of migrating to ABAC, by partially automating the process.
Role mining, i.e., mining of RBAC policies, is an active research area (e.g., [KSS03, SS05, VAW06, VAG07,
ZRE07, CDPO08, FBB08, GVA08, LVA08, VAGA08, CDPOV09, MLL+09, FBB10, MLL10, MCL+10,
MLQ+10, TJ10, VAWG10, CDV12, LVAH12, MPC12, VVAC12, XS12, FBB13, MSAV13, XS13b, ZCG+13])
and a currently relatively small (about $70 million) but rapidly growing commercial market segment [HCBC12].
Some form of role mining is supported by security products from companies of all sizes, from IT giants (e.g.,
IBM Tivoli Access Manager, Oracle Role Manager, CA Technologies GovernanceMinder) to small start-ups
(e.g., Bay31 Role Designer). In contrast, there is, so far, relatively little work on ABAC policy mining. We
recently developed an algorithm to mine an ABAC policy from an ACL policy or RBAC policy [XS13a]; to
the best of our knowledge, it is the first algorithm for that problem.
However, an ACL policy or RBAC policy might not be available, e.g., if the current access control policy
is encoded in a program or is not enforced by a computerized access control mechanism. An alternative
source of information about the current access control policy is operation logs, or “logs” for short. Many
software systems produce logs, e.g., for auditing, accounting, and accountability purposes. Molloy, Park, and
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Chari proposed the idea of mining policies from logs and developed algorithms for mining RBAC policies
from logs [MPC12].
The main challenge is that logs generally provide incomplete information about entitlements (i.e., granted
permissions). Specifically, logs provide only a lower bound on the entitlements. Therefore, the generated
policy should be allowed to include over-assignments, i.e., entitlements not reflected in the logs.
This paper presents an algorithm for mining ABAC policies from logs and attribute data. To the best
of our knowledge, it is the first algorithm for this problem. It is based on our algorithm for mining ABAC
policies from ACLs [XS13a]. At a high level, the algorithm works as follows. It iterates over tuples in the
user-permission relation extracted from the log, uses selected tuples as seeds for constructing candidate rules,
and attempts to generalize each candidate rule to cover additional tuples in the user-permission relation by
replacing conjuncts in attribute expressions with constraints. After constructing candidate rules that together
cover the entire user-permission relation, it attempts to improve the policy by merging and simplifying
candidate rules. Finally, it selects the highest-quality candidate rules for inclusion in the generated policy.
Several changes are needed to our algorithm for mining ABAC policies from ACLs to adapt it to mining
from logs. When the algorithm generalizes, merges, or simplifies rules, it discards candidate rules that are
invalid, i.e., that produce over-assignments. We modify those parts of the algorithm to consider those can-
didate rules, because, as discussed above, over-assignments must be permitted. To evaluate those candidate
rules, we introduce generalized notions of rule quality and policy quality that quantify a trade-off between
the number of over-assignments and other aspects of quality. We consider a metric that includes the normal-
ized number of over-assignments in a weighted sum, a frequency-sensitive variant that assigns higher quality
to rules that cover more frequently used entitlements, along the lines of [MPC12], and a metric based on
a theory quality metric in inductive logic programming [Mug95, Mug97, MF01]. We also modify Xu and
Stoller’s approach to noise detection to take usage frequency into account.
ABAC policy mining is similar to inductive logic programming (ILP), which learns logic-programming
rules from facts. Mining ABAC policies from logs and attribute data is similar to ILP algorithms for learning
from positive examples, because those algorithms allow the learned rules to imply more than the given facts
(i.e., in our terminology, to have over-assignments). We implemented a translation from ABAC policy mining
to Progol [Mug97, MF01], a well-known ILP system.
We evaluated our algorithm and the ILP-based approach on some relatively small but non-trivial hand-
written case studies and on synthetic ABAC policies. The results demonstrate our algorithm’s effectiveness
even when the log reflects only a fraction of the entitlements.
2 ABAC policy language
This section presents the ABAC policy language used in our work. It is adopted from [XS13a]. For simplicity
and concreteness, we consider a specific ABAC policy language, but our approach is general and can be
adapted to other ABAC policy languages. Our ABAC policy language contains the common ABAC policy
language constructs, except arithmetic inequalities and negation, which are left for future work.
ABAC policies refer to attributes of users and resources. Given a set U of users and a set Au of user
attributes, user attribute data is represented by a function du such that du(u, a) is the value of attribute a for
user u. There is a distinguished user attribute uid that has a unique value for each user. Similarly, given a set
R of resources and a set Ar of resource attributes, resource attribute data is represented by a function dr such
that dr(r, a) is the value of attribute a for resource r. There is a distinguished resource attribute rid that has
a unique value for each resource. We assume the set Au of user attributes can be partitioned into a set Au,1 of
single-valued user attributes which have atomic values, and a set Au,m of multi-valued user attributes whose
values are sets of atomic values. Similarly, we assume the set Ar of resource attributes can be partitioned
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into a set Ar,1 of single-valued resource attributes and a set of Ar,m of multi-valued resource attributes. Let
Vals be the set of possible atomic values of attributes. We assume Vals includes a distinguished value ⊥
used to indicate that an attribute’s value is unknown. The set of possible values of multi-valued attributes
is Valm = Set(Vals \ {⊥}) ∪ ⊥, where Set(S) is the powerset of set S.
Attribute expressions are used to express the sets of users and resources to which a rule applies. A
user-attribute expression (UAE) is a function e such that, for each user attribute a, e(a) is either the special
value >, indicating that e imposes no constraint on the value of a, or a set (interpreted as a disjunction)
of possible values of a excluding ⊥ (in other words, a subset of Vals \ {⊥} or Valm \ {⊥}, depending on
whether a is single-valued or multi-valued). We refer to e(a) as the conjunct for attribute a. A user-attribute
expression e uses attribute a if e(a) 6= >. Let attr(e) denote the set of attributes used by e.
A user u satisfies a user-attribute expression e, denoted u |= e, iff (∀a ∈ Au,1. e(a) = > ∨ ∃v ∈
e(a). du(u, a) = v) and (∀a ∈ Au,m. e(a) = > ∨ ∃v ∈ e(a). du(u, a) ⊇ v). For multi-valued attributes, we
use the condition du(u, a) ⊇ v instead of du(u, a) = v because elements of a multi-valued user attribute
typically represent some type of capabilities of a user, so using ⊇ expresses that the user has the specified
capabilities and possibly more.
For example, suppose Au,1 = {dept,position} and Au,m = {courses}. The function e1 with e1(dept) =
{CS} and e1(position) = {grad,ugrad} and e1(courses) = {{CS101,CS102}} is a user-attribute expression
satisfied by users in the CS department who are either graduate or undergraduate students and whose courses
include CS101 and CS102.
We introduce a concrete syntax for attribute expressions, for improved readability in examples. We
write a user attribute expression as a conjunction of the conjuncts not equal to >. Suppose e(a) 6= >.
Let v = e(a). When a is single-valued, we write the conjunct for a as a ∈ v; as syntactic sugar, if v is
a singleton set {s}, we may write the conjunct as a = s. When a is multi-valued, we write the conjunct
for a as a ⊇∈ v (indicating that a is a superset of an element of v); as syntactic sugar, if v is a singleton
set {s}, we may write the conjunct as a ⊇ s. For example, the above expression e1 may be written as
dept = CS ∧ position ∈ {ugrad, grad} ∧ courses ⊇ {CS101,CS102}. For an example that uses ⊇∈, the
expression e2 that is the same as e1 except with e2(courses) = {{CS101}, {CS102}} may be written as
dept = CS ∧ position ∈ {ugrad, grad} ∧ courses ⊇∈ {{CS101}, {CS102}}, and is satisfied by graduate or
undergraduate students in the CS department whose courses include either CS101 or CS102.
The meaning of a user-attribute expression e, denoted [[e]]U , is the set of users in U that satisfy it:
[[e]]U = {u ∈ U | u |= e}. User attribute data is an implicit argument to [[e]]U . We say that e characterizes
the set [[e]]U .
A resource-attribute expression (RAE) is defined similarly, except using the set Ar of resource attributes
instead of the set Au of user attributes. The semantics of RAEs is defined similarly to the semantics of
UAEs, except simply using equality, not ⊇, in the condition for multi-valued attributes in the definition
of “satisfies”, because we do not interpret elements of multi-valued resource attributes specially (e.g., as
capabilities).
Constraints express relationships between users and resources. An atomic constraint is a formula f
of the form au,m ⊇ ar,m, au,m 3 ar,1, or au,1 = ar,1, where au,1 ∈ Au,1, au,m ∈ Au,m, ar,1 ∈ Ar,1, and
ar,m ∈ Ar,m. The first two forms express that user attributes contain specified values. This is a common
type of constraint, because user attributes typically represent some type of capabilities of a user. Other forms
of atomic constraint are possible (e.g., au,m ⊆ ar,m) but less common, so we leave them for future work. Let
uAttr(f) and rAttr(f) refer to the user attribute and resource attribute, respectively, used in f . User u and
resource r satisfy an atomic constraint f , denoted 〈u, r〉 |= f , if du(u,uAttr(f)) 6= ⊥ and dr(u, rAttr(f)) 6= ⊥
and formula f holds when the values du(u,uAttr(f)) and dr(u, rAttr(f)) are substituted in it.
A constraint is a set (interpreted as a conjunction) of atomic constraints. User u and resource r satisfy
a constraint c, denoted 〈u, r〉 |= c, if they satisfy every atomic constraint in c. In examples, we write
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constraints as conjunctions instead of sets. For example, the constraint “specialties ⊇ topics ∧ teams 3
treatingTeam” is satisfied by user u and resource r if the user’s specialties include all of the topics associated
with the resource, and the set of teams associated with the user contains the treatingTeam associated with
the resource.
A user-permission tuple is a tuple 〈u, r, o〉 containing a user, a resource, and an operation. This tuple
means that user u has permission to perform operation o on resource r. A user-permission relation is a set
of such tuples.
A rule is a tuple 〈eu, er, O, c〉, where eu is a user-attribute expression, er is a resource-attribute expression,
O is a set of operations, and c is a constraint. For a rule ρ = 〈eu, er, O, c〉, let uae(ρ) = eu, rae(ρ) = er,
ops(ρ) = O, and con(ρ) = c. For example, the rule 〈true, type=task ∧ proprietary=false, {read, request},
projects 3 project ∧ expertise ⊇ expertise〉 used in our project management case study can be interpreted
as “A user working on a project can read and request to work on a non-proprietary task whose required
areas of expertise are among his/her areas of expertise.” User u, resource r, and operation o satisfy a rule
ρ, denoted 〈u, r, o〉 |= ρ, if u |= uae(ρ) ∧ r |= rae(ρ) ∧ o ∈ ops(ρ) ∧ 〈u, r〉 |= con(ρ).
An ABAC policy is a tuple 〈U,R,Op, Au, Ar, du, dr,Rules〉, where U , R, Au, Ar, du, and dr are as described
above, Op is a set of operations, and Rules is a set of rules.
The user-permission relation induced by a rule ρ is [[ρ]] = {〈u, r, o〉 ∈ U × R × Op | 〈u, r, o〉 |= ρ}. Note
that U , R, du, and dr are implicit arguments to [[ρ]].
The user-permission relation induced by a policy pi with the above form is [[pi]] =
⋃
ρ∈Rules [[ρ]].
3 Problem Definition
An operation log entry e is a tuple 〈u, r, o, t〉 where u ∈ U is a user, r ∈ R is a resource, o ∈ Op is an
operation, and t is a timestamp. An operation log is a sequence of operation log entries. The user-permission
relation induced by an operation log L is UP(L) = {〈u, r, o〉 | ∃t. 〈u, r, o, t〉 ∈ L}.
The input to the ABAC-from-logs policy mining problem is a tuple I = 〈U,R,Op, Au, Ar, du, dr, L〉, where
U is a set of users, R is a set of resources, Op is a set of operations, Au is a set of user attributes, Ar is a set
of resource attributes, du is user attribute data, dr is resource attribute data, and L is an operation log, such
that the users, resources, and operations that appear in L are subsets of U , R, and Op, respectively. The goal
of the problem is to find a set of rules Rules such that the ABAC policy pi = 〈U,R,Op, Au, Ar, du, dr,Rules〉
maximizes a suitable policy quality metric.
The policy quality metric should reflect the size and meaning of the policy. Size is measured by weighted
structural complexity (WSC) [MCL+10], and smaller policies are considered to have higher quality. This is
consistent with usability studies of access control rules, which conclude that more concise policies are more
manageable [BM13]. Informally, the WSC of an ABAC policy is a weighted sum of the number of elements
in the policy. Specifically, the WSC of an attribute expression is the number of atomic values that appear in
it, the WSC of an operation set is the number of operations in it, the WSC of a constraint is the number of
atomic constraints in it, and the WSC of a rule is a weighted sum of the WSCs of its components, namely,
WSC(〈eu, er, O, c〉) = w1WSC(eu) +w2WSC(er) +w3WSC(O) +w4WSC(c), where the wi are user-specified
weights. The WSC of a set of rules is the sum of the WSCs of its members.
The meaning [[pi]] of the ABAC policy is taken into account by considering the differences from UP(L),
which consist of over-assignments and under-assignments. The over-assignments are [[pi]] \ UP(L). The
under-assignments are UP(L) \ [[pi]]. Since logs provide only a lower-bound on the actual user-permission
relation (a.k.a entitlements), it is necessary to allow some over-assignments, but not too many. Allowing
under-assignments is beneficial if the logs might contain noise, in the form of log entries representing uses of
permissions that should not be granted, because it reduces the amount of such noise that gets propagated
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into the mined policy, and it improves the stability of the generated policy.. We define a policy quality metric
that is a weighted sum of these aspects:
Qpol(pi, L) = WSC(pi) + wo | [[pi]] \UP(L)| / |U |+ wu|UP(L) \ [[pi]] |L (1)
where the policy over-assignment weight wo and the under-assignment weight wu are user-specified weights
for over-assignments and under-assignments, respectively, and for a set S of user-permission tuples, the
frequency-weighted size of S with respect to log L is |S|L =
∑
〈u,r,o〉∈S freq(〈u, r, o〉, L), where the rela-
tive frequency of a user-permission tuple in a log is given by the frequency function freq(〈u, r, o〉, L) = |{e ∈
L | userPerm(e) = 〈u, r, o〉}| / |L|, where the user-permission part of a log entry is given by userPerm(〈u, r, o, t〉) =
〈u, r, o〉. Using the relative frequency, instead of the number of occurrences, of a user-permission tuple as
the weight in the definition of frequency-weighted size allows wu to be chosen independent of the duration of
monitoring and the number of monitored users; for example, if the duration of monitoring or the number of
monitored users is doubled, and the distribution of their behaviors and the value of wu are kept unchanged,
then the policy quality is unchanged. Similarly, dividing the number of over-assignments by |U | allows wo
to be chosen independent of the number of users (and the duration of monitoring).
For simplicity, our presentation of the problem and algorithm assume that attribute data does not change
during the time covered by the log. Accommodating changes to attribute data is not difficult. It mainly
requires re-defining the notions of policy quality and rule quality (introduced in Section 4) to be based on
the set of log entries covered by a rule, denoted [[ρ]]LE, rather than [[ρ]]. The definition of [[ρ]]LE is similar to
the definition of [[ρ]], except that, when determining whether a log entry is in [[ρ]]LE, the attribute data in
effect at the time of the log entry is used.
4 Algorithm
Our algorithm is based on the algorithm for mining ABAC policies from ACLs and attribute data in [XS13a].
Our algorithm does not take the order of log entries into account, so the log can be summarized by the user-
permission relation UP0 induced by the log and the frequency function freq, described in the penultimate
paragraph of Section 3.
Top-level pseudocode appears in Figure 1. We refer to tuples selected in the first statement of the
first while loop as seeds. The top-level pseudocode is explained by embedded comments. It calls several
functions, described next. Function names hyperlink to pseudocode for the function, if it is included in the
paper, otherwise to the description of the function.
The function addCandRule(su, sr, so, cc, uncovUP ,Rules) in Figure 2 first calls computeUAE to compute
a user-attribute expression eu that characterizes su, and computeRAE to compute a resource-attribute
expression er that characterizes sr. It then calls generalizeRule(ρ, cc, uncovUP ,Rules) to generalize rule
ρ = 〈eu, er, so, ∅〉 to ρ′ and adds ρ′ to candidate rule set Rules. The details of the functions called by
addCandRule are described next.
The function computeUAE(s, U) in Figure 3 computes a user-attribute expression eu that characterizes
the set s of users. Preference is given to attribute expressions that do not use uid, since attribute-based poli-
cies are generally preferable to identity-based policies, even when they have higher WSC, because attribute-
based generalize better. After constructing a candidate expression e, it calls elimRedundantSets(e), which
attempts to lower the WSC of e by examining the conjunct for each multi-valued user attribute, and re-
moving each set that is a superset of another set in the same conjunct; this leaves the meaning of the rule
unchanged, because ⊇ is used in the condition for multi-valued attributes in the semantics of user attribute
expressions. Pseudocode for elimRedundantSets is straightforward and omitted. The expression eu returned
by computeUAE might not be minimum-sized among expressions that characterize s: it is possible that
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some attributes mapped to a set of values by eu can instead be mapped to >. We defer minimization of
eu until after the call to generalizeRule (described below), because minimizing eu before that would reduce
opportunities to find relations between values of user attributes and resource attributes in generalizeRule.
The function computeRAE(s,R) computes a resource-attribute expression that characterizes the set s of
resources. The definition is the same as for computeUAE, except using resource attributes instead of user
attributes, and the call to elimRedundantSets is omitted. Pseudocode for computeRAE is omitted.
The function candidateConstraint(r, u) returns a set containing all of the atomic constraints that hold
between resource r and user u. Pseudocode for candidateConstraint is straightforward and omitted.
The function generalizeRule(ρ, cc, uncovUP ,Rules) in Figure 4 attempts to generalize rule ρ by adding
some of the atomic constraints in cc to ρ and eliminating the conjuncts of the user attribute expression
and/or the resource attribute expression corresponding to the attributes used in those constraints, i.e.,
mapping those attributes to >. We call a rule obtained in this way a generalization of ρ. Such a rule is
more general than ρ in the sense that it refers to relationships instead of specific values. Also, the user-
permission relation induced by a generalization of ρ is a superset of the user-permission relation induced by
ρ. generalizeRule(ρ, cc, uncovUP ,Rules) returns the generalization ρ′ of ρ with the best quality according
to a given rule quality metric. Note that ρ′ may cover tuples that are already covered (i.e., are in UP); in
other words, our algorithm can generate policies containing rules whose meanings overlap.
A rule quality metric is a functionQrul(ρ,UP) that maps a rule ρ to a totally-ordered set, with the ordering
chosen so that larger values indicate high quality. The second argument UP is a set of user-permission tuples.
Our rule quality metric assigns higher quality to rules that cover more currently uncovered user-permission
tuples and have smaller size, with an additional term that imposes a penalty for over-assignments, measured
as a fraction of the number of user-permission tuples covered by the rule, and with a weight specified by a
parameter w′o, called the rule over-assignment weight.
Qrul(ρ,UP) =
| [[ρ]] ∩UP |
|ρ| × (1−
w′o × | [[ρ]] \UP(L)|
| [[ρ]] | ).
In generalizeRule, uncovUP is the second argument to Qrul, so [[ρ]]∩UP is the set of user-permission tuples
in UP0 that are covered by ρ and not covered by rules already in the policy. The loop over i near the
end of the pseudocode for generalizeRule considers all possibilities for the first atomic constraint in cc that
gets added to the constraint of ρ. The function calls itself recursively to determine the subsequent atomic
constraints in c that get added to the constraint.
We also developed a frequency-sensitive variant of this rule quality metric. Let Qfreqrul denote the frequency-
weighted variant of Qrul, obtained by weighting each user-permission tuple by its relative frequency (i.e.,
fraction of occurrences) in the log, similar to the definition of λ-distance in [MPC12]. Specifically, the
definition of Qfreqrul is obtained from the definition of Qrul by replacing | [[ρ]] ∩ UP | with | [[ρ]] ∩ UP |L (recall
that | · |L is defined in Section 3).
We also developed a rule quality metric QILPrul based closely on the theory quality metric for inductive
logic programming described in [Mug95]. Details of the definition appear in Appendix A.
The function mergeRules(Rules) in Figure 4 attempts to improve the quality of Rules by removing
redundant rules and merging pairs of rules. A rule ρ in Rules is redundant if Rules contains another rule ρ′
such that every user-permission tuple in UP0 that is in [[ρ]] is also in [[ρ
′]]. Informally, rules ρ1 and ρ2 are
merged by taking, for each attribute, the union of the conjuncts in ρ1 and ρ2 for that attribute. If adding the
resulting rule ρmrg to the policy and removing rules (including ρ1 and ρ2) that become redundant improves
policy quality and ρmrg does not have over-assignments, then ρmrg is added to Rules, and the redundant
rules are removed from Rules. As optimizations (in the implementation, not reflected in the pseudocode),
meanings of rules are cached, and policy quality is computed incrementally. mergeRules(Rules) updates its
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// Rules is the set of candidate rules
Rules = ∅
// uncovUP contains user-permission tuples
// in UP0 that are not covered by Rules
uncovUP = UP0.copy()
while ¬uncovUP .isEmpty()
// Select an uncovered tuple as a “seed”.
〈u, r, o〉 = some tuple in uncovUP
cc = candidateConstraint(r, u)
// su contains users with permission 〈r, o〉
// and that have the same candidate
// constraint for r as u
su = {u′ ∈ U | 〈u′, r, o〉 ∈ UP0
∧ candidateConstraint(r, u′) = cc}
addCandRule(su, {r}, {o}, cc, uncovUP ,Rules)
// so is set of operations that u can apply to r
so = {o′ ∈ Op | 〈u, r, o′〉 ∈ UP0}
addCandRule({u}, {r}, so, cc, uncovUP ,Rules)
end while
// Repeatedly merge and simplify
// rules, until this has no effect
mergeRules(Rules)
while simplifyRules(Rules)
&& mergeRules(Rules)
skip
end while
// Select high quality rules into Rules ′.
Rules ′ = ∅
Repeatedly move highest-quality rule
from Rules to Rules ′ until∑
ρ∈Rules′ [[ρ]] ⊇ UP0, using
UP0 \
[[
Rules ′
]]
as second argument to
Qrul, and discarding a rule if it does
not cover any tuples in UP0 currently
uncovered by Rules ′.
return Rules ′
Figure 1: Policy mining algorithm. The pseudocode starts in column 1 and continues in column 2.
function addCandRule(su, sr, so, cc, uncovUP ,Rules)
// Construct a rule ρ that covers user-permission tuples {〈u, r, o〉 | u ∈ su ∧ r ∈ sr ∧ o ∈ so}.
eu = computeUAE(su, U);
er = computeRAE(sr, R);
ρ = 〈eu, er, so, ∅〉
ρ′ = generalizeRule(ρ, cc, uncovUP ,Rules);
Rules.add(ρ′);
uncovUP .removeAll([[ρ′]])
Figure 2: Compute a candidate rule ρ′ and add ρ′ to candidate rule set Rules
argument Rules in place, and it returns a Boolean indicating whether any rules were merged.
5 Functions to Simplify Rules
The function simplifyRules(Rules) in Figure 5 attempts to simplify all of the rules in Rules. It updates
its argument Rules in place, replacing rules in Rules with simplified versions when simplification succeeds.
It returns a Boolean indicating whether any rules were simplified. It attempts to simplify each rule in
several ways, which are embodied in the following functions that it calls. The names of these functions
start with “elim”, because they attempt to eliminate unnecessary parts of rules. To enable simplifyRules
to determine whether any rules were simplified, each “elim” function returns a Boolean value indicating
whether it simplified any rules. For brevity, computation of the Boolean return values of “elim” functions
are not reflected in the pseudocode.
The function elimRedundantSets is described above. It returns false, even if some redundant sets were
eliminated, because elimination of redundant sets does not affect the meaning or mergeability of rules, so it
need not trigger another iteration of merging and simplification.
The function elimConjuncts(ρ,Rules,UP) in Figure 5 attempts to increase the quality of rule ρ by
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function computeUAE(s, U)
// First try to characterize set s of users without using
// uid. Use all other attributes which have known
// values for all users in s.
e = (λ a ∈ Au.
a=uid ∨ (∃u ∈ s. du(u, a) = ⊥) ?> :
⋃
u∈s du(u, a))
if [[e]]U 6= s
// uid is needed to characterize s
e(uid) =
⋃
u∈s du(u,uid)
end if
elimRedundantSets(e)
return e
Figure 3: Compute a user-attribute expression that characterizes set s of users, where U is the set of all
users.
eliminating some of the conjuncts. It calls the function elimConjunctsHelper(ρ,A,UP) in Figure 5, which
considers all rules that differ from ρ by mapping a subset A′ of the tagged attributes in A to > instead
of to a set of values; among the resulting rules that are valid, it returns one with the highest quality. A
tagged attribute is a pair of the form 〈"user", a〉 with a ∈ Au or 〈"res", a〉 with a ∈ Ar. The set Aunrm
in elimConjuncts is a set of unremovable tagged attributes; it is a parameter of the algorithm, specifying
attributes that should not be eliminated, because eliminating them increases the risk of generating an overly
general policy, i.e., a policy that might grant inappropriate permissions when new users or new resources
(hence new permissions) are added to the system. We use a combinatorial algorithm for elimConjuncts that
evaluates all combinations of conjuncts that can be eliminated, because elimination of one conjunct might
prevent elimination of another conjunct. This algorithm makes elimConjuncts worst-case exponential in the
numbers of user attributes and resource attributes that can be eliminated while preserving validity of the rule;
in practice the number of such attributes is small. elimConjuncts also considers whether to remove conjuncts
from the user attribute expression or the resource attribute expression first, because elimination of a conjunct
in one attribute expression might prevent elimination of a conjunct in the other. The algorithm could simply
try both orders, but instead it uses a heuristic that, in our experiments, is faster and almost as effective:
if maxConjunctSz(eu) ≥ maxConjunctSz(er) then eliminate conjuncts from the user attribute expression
first, otherwise eliminate conjuncts from the resource attribute expression first, where maxConjunctSz(e)
is the size (WSC) of the largest conjunct in attribute expression e. elimConjunctsHelper calls the function
elimAttribute(ρ, ta), which returns a copy of rule ρ with the conjunct for tagged attribute ta removed from
the user attribute expression or resource attribute expression as appropriate (in other words, the specified
attribute is mapped to ⊥); pseudocode for elimAttribute is straightforward and omitted.
The function elimConstraints(ρ,Rules,UP) attempts to improve the quality of ρ by removing unnecessary
atomic constraints from ρ’s constraint. An atomic constraint is unnecessary in a rule ρ if removing it from ρ’s
constraint leaves ρ valid. Pseudocode for elimConstraints is analogous to elimConjuncts, except it considers
removing atomic constraints instead of conjuncts from rules.
The function elimElements(ρ) attempts to decrease the WSC of rule ρ by removing elements from sets
in conjuncts for multi-valued user attributes, if removal of those elements preserves validity of ρ; note that,
because ⊆ is used in the semantics of user attribute expressions, the set of user-permission tuples that
satisfy a rule is never decreased by such removals. It would be reasonable to use a combinatorial algorithm
for elimElements, in the same style as elimConjuncts and elimConstraints, because elimination of one set
element can prevent elimination of another. We decided to use a simple linear algorithm for this function, for
simplicity and because it is likely to give the same results, because elimElements usually eliminates only 0
8
function generalizeRule(ρ, cc, uncovUP ,
Rules)
// ρbest is best generalization of ρ
ρbest = ρ
// gen[i][j] is a generalization of ρ using
// cc′[i]
gen = new Rule[cc.length][3]
for i = 1 to cc.length
f = cc[i]
// generalize by adding f and eliminating
// conjuncts for both attributes used in f .
gen[i][1] = 〈uae(ρ)[uAttr(f) 7→ >],
rae(ρ)[rAttr(f) 7→ >],
ops(ρ), con(ρ) ∪ {f}〉
// generalize by adding f and eliminating
// conjunct for user attribute used in f
gen[i][2] = 〈uae(ρ)[uAttr(f) 7→ >], rae(ρ),
ops(ρ), con(ρ) ∪ {f}〉
// generalize by adding f and eliminating
// conjunct for resource attrib. used in f .
gen[i][3] = 〈uae(ρ), rae(ρ)[rAttr(f) 7→ >],
ops(ρ), con(ρ) ∪ {f}〉
end for
for i = 1 to cc.length and j = 1 to 3
// try to further generalize gen[i]
ρ′′ = generalizeRule(gen[i][j], cc[i+1 ..],
uncovUP ,Rules)
if Qrul(ρ
′′, uncovUP) > Qrul(ρbest,
uncovUP)
ρbest = ρ
′′
end if
end for
return ρbest
function mergeRules(Rules)
// Remove redundant rules
redun = {ρ ∈ Rules | ∃ ρ′ ∈ Rules \ {ρ}.
[[ρ]] ∩UP0 ⊆ [[ρ′]] ∩UP0}
Rules.removeAll(redun)
// Merge rules
workSet = {(ρ1, ρ2) | ρ1 ∈ Rules ∧ ρ2 ∈ Rules
∧ ρ1 6= ρ2 ∧ con(ρ1) = con(ρ2)}
while not(workSet.empty())
(ρ1, ρ2) = workSet .remove()
ρmrg = 〈uae(ρ1) ∪ uae(ρ2),
rae(ρ1) ∪ rae(ρ2),
ops(ρ1) ∪ ops(ρ2), con(ρ1)〉
// Find rules that become redundant
// if merged rule ρmrg is added
redun = {ρ ∈ Rules | [[ρ]] ⊆ [[ρmrg]]}
// Add the merged rule and remove redun-
// dant rules if this improves policy quality
// and the merged rule does not have
// over-assignments.
if (Qpol(Rules ∪ {ρmrg} \ redun) < Qpol(Rules)
∧ [[ρmrg]] ⊆ UP0)
Rules.removeAll(redun)
workSet .removeAll({(ρ1, ρ2) ∈ workSet |
ρ1 ∈ redun ∨ ρ2 ∈ redun})
workSet .addAll({(ρmrg, ρ) | ρ ∈ Rules
∧ con(ρ) = con(ρmrg)})
Rules.add(ρmrg)
end if
end while
return true if any rules were merged
Figure 4: Left: Generalize rule ρ by adding some formulas from cc to its constraint and eliminating conjuncts
for attributes used in those formulas. f [x 7→ y] denotes a copy of function f modified so that f(x) = y.
a[i..] denotes the suffix of array a starting at index i. Right: Merge pairs of rules in Rules, when possible, to
reduce the WSC of Rules. (a, b) denotes an unordered pair with components a and b. The union e = e1 ∪ e2
of attribute expressions e1 and e2 over the same set A of attributes is defined by: for all attributes a in A,
if e1(a) = > or e2(a) = > then e(a) = > otherwise e(a) = e1(a) ∪ e2(a).
or 1 set elements per rule in our experiments. Pseudocode for elimElements is straightforward and omitted.
The function elimOverlapVal(ρ,Rules) attempts to decrease the WSC of rule ρ by removing values from
conjuncts of attribute expressions in ρ if there are other rules that cover the affected user-permission tuples
and have higher quality. Specifically, a value v in the conjunct for a user attribute a in ρ is removed if there
is another rule ρ′ in Rules such that (1) attr(uae(ρ′)) ⊆ attr(uae(ρ)) and attr(rae(ρ′)) ⊆ attr(rae(ρ)), (2)
the conjunct of uae(ρ′) for a contains v, (3) each conjunct of uae(ρ′) or rae(ρ′) other than the conjunct for
a is either > or a superset of the corresponding conjunct of ρ, and (4) con(ρ′) ⊆ con(ρ). The condition for
removal of a value in the conjunct for a resource attribute is analogous. If a conjunct of uae(ρ) or rae(ρ)
becomes empty, ρ is removed from Rules. elimOverlapVal(ρ,Rules) returns true if it modifies or removes ρ,
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otherwise it returns false. Pseudocode for elimOverlapVal is straightforward and omitted.
The function elimOverlapOp(ρ,Rules) attempts to decrease the WSC of rule ρ by removing operations
from ops(ρ), if there are other rules that cover the affected user-permission tuples. Specifically, an operation
o is removed from ops(ρ) if there is another rule ρ′ in Rules such that (1) attr(uae(ρ′)) ⊆ attr(uae(ρ)) and
attr(rae(ρ′)) ⊆ attr(rae(ρ)), (2) ops(ρ′) contains o, (3) each conjunct of uae(ρ′) or rae(ρ′) is either > or a
superset of the corresponding conjunct of ρ, and (4) con(ρ′) is a subset of con(ρ). If ops(ρ) becomes empty, ρ
is removed from Rules. elimOverlapOp(ρ,Rules) returns true if it modifies or removes ρ, otherwise it returns
false. Pseudocode for elimOverlapOp is straightforward and omitted.
5.1 Example
We illustrate the algorithm on a small fragment of our university case study (cf. Section 6.1). The fragment
contains a single rule ρ0 = 〈true, type ∈ {gradebook}, {addScore, readScore}, crsTaught 3 crs〉 and all of the
attribute data from the full case study, except attribute data for gradebooks for courses other than cs601.
We consider an operation log L containing three entries: {〈csFac2, cs601gradebook, addScore, t1〉, 〈csFac2,
cs601gradebook, readScore, t2〉, 〈csStu3, cs601gradebook, addScore, t3〉}. User csFac2 is a faculty in the
computer science department who is teaching cs601; attributes are position = faculty, dept = cs, and
crsTaught = {cs601}. csStu3 is a CS student who is a TA of cs601; attributes are position = student,
dept = cs, and crsTaught = {cs601}. cs601gradebook is a resource with attributes type = gradebook,
dept = cs, and crs = cs601.
Our algorithm selects user-permission tuple 〈csFac2, cs601gradebook, addScore〉 as the first seed, and
calls function candidateConstraint to compute the set of atomic constraints that hold between csFac2 and
cs601gradebook; the result is cc = {dept = dept, crsTaught 3 crs}. addCandRule is called twice to compute
candidate rules. The first call to addCandRule calls computeUAE to compute a UAE eu that characterizes the
set su containing users with permission 〈addScore, cs601gradebook〉 and with the same candidate constraint
as csFac2 for cs601gradebook; the result is eu = (position ∈ {faculty, student} ∧ dept ∈ {cs} ∧ crsTaught ⊇
{{cs601}}). addCandRule also calls computeRAE to compute a resource-attribute expression that char-
acterizes {cs601gradebook}; the result is er = (crs ∈ {cs601} ∧ dept ∈ {cs} ∧ type ∈ {gradebook}). The
set of operations considered in this call to addCandRule is simply so = {addScore}. addCandRule then
calls generalizeRule, which generates a candidate rule ρ1 which initially has eu, er and so in the first
three components, and then atomic constraints in cc are added to ρ1, and conjuncts in eu and er for
attributes used in cc are eliminated; the result is ρ1 = 〈position ∈ {faculty, student}, type ∈ {gradebook},
{addScore},dept = dept ∧ crsTaught 3 crs〉, which also covers the entitlement in the third log entry. Simi-
larly, the second call to addCandRule generates a candidate rule ρ2 = 〈position ∈ {faculty}, type ∈ {gradebook},
{addScore, readScore}, dept = dept ∧ crsTaught 3 crs〉, which also covers the entitlement in the second log
entry.
All of UP(L) is covered, so our algorithm calls mergeRules, which attempts to merge ρ1 and ρ2 into rule
ρ3 = 〈position ∈ {faculty, student}, type ∈ {gradebook}, {addScore, readScore},dept = dept ∧ crsTaught 3 crs〉.
ρ3 is discarded because it introduces an over-assignment user-permission tuple 〈csStu3, cs601gradebook,
readScore〉 while ρ1 and ρ2 do not. Next, simplifyRules is called, which first simplifies ρ1 and ρ2 to ρ′1 and
ρ′2, respectively, and then eliminates ρ
′
1 because it covers a subset of the tuples covered by ρ
′
2. The final
result is ρ′2, which is identical to the rule ρ0 in the original policy.
5.2 Noise Detection
If the input might contain noise, in the form of log entries representing uses of permissions that should not
be granted, then the algorithm should allow the generated policy to have under-assignments (i.e., it should
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function simplifyRules(Rules)
for ρ in Rules
elimRedundantSets(uae(ρ))
elimConjuncts(ρ,Rules,UP0)
elimElements(ρ)
end for
for ρ in Rules
elimOverlapVal(ρ,Rules)
end for
for ρ in Rules
elimOverlapOp(ρ,Rules)
end for
for ρ in Rules
elimConstraints(ρ,Rules,UP0)
end for
return true if any ρ in Rules was changed
function elimConjuncts(ρ,Rules,UP)
Au = {"user"} × attr(uae(ρ)) \Aunrm
Ar = {"res"} × attr(rae(ρ)) \Aunrm
if maxConjunctSz(uae(ρ)) ≥ maxConjunctSz(rae(ρ))
ρ′ = elimConjunctsHelper(ρ,Au,UP)
ρ′′ = elimConjunctsHelper(ρ′, Ar,UP)
else
ρ′ = elimConjunctsHelper(ρ,Ar,UP)
ρ′′ = elimConjunctsHelper(ρ′, Au,UP)
end if
if ρ′′ 6= ρ
replace ρ with ρ′′ in Rules
end if
function elimConjunctsHelper(ρ,A,UP)
ρbest = ρ
// Discard tagged attributes ta such that elimi-
// nation of the conjunct for ta makes ρ invalid.
for ta in A
ρ′ = elimAttribute(ρ, ta)
if not [[ρ′]] ⊆ UP0
A.remove(ta)
end if
end for
for i = 1 to A.length // treat A as an array
ρ′ = elimAttribute(ρ,A[i])
ρ′′ = elimConjunctsHelper(ρ′, A[i+1 ..])
if Qrul(ρ
′′,UP) > Qrul(ρbest,UP)
ρbest = ρ
′′
end if
end for
return ρbest
Figure 5: Functions used to simplify rules.
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allow UP(L)\ [[pi]] to be non-empty), to reduce the amount of such noise that gets propagated into the policy.
Such noise in the logs is due to over-assignments in the currently deployed access control policy. We adopt
the approach in [XS13a] to identify suspected over-assignment noise. The main idea is that rules with quality
below a threshold τ are considered to represent noise and hence are omitted from the generated policy, and
that user-permission tuples in UP(L) that are represented only by rules classified as noise are reported
as suspected over-assignment noise. An additional consideration in this context is that usage frequency
should be considered: under-assignments in the generated policy should correspond to infrequently used
entitlements. Thus, the rule quality metric used to identify rules that represent noise should be frequency-
sensitive. One option is to use the frequency-sensitive rule quality metric Qfreqrul . Another option is to use a
metric focused exclusively on the usage frequency of the permissions covered by a rule, ignoring the size of
the rule, the number of covered user-permission tuples, and the over-assignments (if any). Such a metric is
Qfreq(ρ, L) = | [[ρ]] |−1
∑
t∈[[ρ]] freq(t, L).
The rule quality metric used for noise detection can be the same rule quality metric used in the main
part of the algorithm, in which case the main part of the algorithm is modified to stop adding candidate
rules to the final policy when the rule quality drops below threshold, or a different metric, in which case
an additional loop is added at the end of the algorithm to find and remove rules whose quality is below
threshold.
6 Evaluation Methodology
We evaluate our policy mining algorithms on synthetic operation logs generated from ABAC policies (some
handwritten and some synthetic) and probability distributions characterizing the frequency of actions. This
allows us to evaluate the effectiveness of our algorithm by comparing the mined policies with the original
ABAC policies. We are eager to also evaluate our algorithm on actual operation logs and actual attribute
data, when we are able to obtain them.
6.1 ABAC Policies
Case Studies. We developed four case studies for use in evaluation of our algorithm, described briefly
here. Details of the case studies, including all policy rules, various size metrics (number of users, number of
resources, etc.), and some illustrative attribute data, appear in [XS13a].
Our university case study is a policy that controls access by students, instructors, teaching assistants,
registrar officers, department chairs, and admissions officers to applications (for admission), gradebooks,
transcripts, and course schedules. Our health care case study is a policy that controls access by nurses,
doctors, patients, and agents (e.g., a patient’s spouse) to electronic health records (HRs) and HR items (i.e.,
entries in health records). Our project management case study is a policy that controls access by department
managers, project leaders, employees, contractors, auditors, accountants, and planners to budgets, schedules,
and tasks associated with projects. Our online video case study is a policy that controls access to videos by
users of an online video service.
The number of rules in the case studies is relatively small (10 ± 1 for the first three case studies, and 6
for online video), but they express non-trivial policies and exercise all the features of our policy language,
including use of set membership and superset relations in attribute expressions and constraints. The manually
written attribute dataset for each case study contains a small number of instances of each type of user and
resource.
For the first three case studies, we generated a series of synthetic attribute datasets, parameterized by a
number N , which is the number of departments for the university and project management case studies, and
the number of wards for the health care case study. The generated attribute data for users and resources
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associated with each department or ward are similar to but more numerous than the attribute data in the
manually written datasets. We did not bother creating synthetic data for the online video case study, because
the rules are simpler.
Synthetic Policies. We generated synthetic policies using the algorithm proposed by Xu and Stoller
[XS13a]. Briefly, the policy synthesis algorithm first generates the rules and then uses the rules to guide
generation of the attribute data; this allows control of the number of granted permissions. The algorithm
takes Nrule, the desired number of rules, as an input. The numbers of users and resources are proportional
to the number of rules. Generation of rules and attribute data is based on several probability distributions,
which are based loosely on the case studies or assumed to have a simple functional form (e.g., uniform
distribution).
6.2 Log Generation
We first describe a straightforward but inefficient log generation algorithm, and then describe the log sum-
mary generation algorithm that is actually used in our experiments.
Log Generation Algorithm. The inputs to the algorithm are an ABAC policy pi, the desired complete-
ness of the log, and several probability distributions. The completeness of a log, relative to an ABAC policy,
is the fraction of user-permission tuples in the meaning of the policy that appear in at least one entry in the
log. We use completeness as a measure of log size relative to policy size. The algorithm generates each log
entry by first selecting an ABAC rule, according to a probability distribution on roles, and then selecting a
user-permission tuple that satisfies the rule, according to probability distributions on users, resources, and
operations. This process is repeated until the specified completeness is reached.
Specifically, our log generation algorithm uses the following probability distributions. For each rule ρ
in pi, Prule(ρ) is the probability of selecting ρ. For each operation o and rule ρ, Pop(o|ρ) is the conditional
probability of selecting operation o when ρ has been selected; for sanity, we require Pop(o|ρ) = 0 if o 6∈
ops(ρ). For each user u, resource r, and rule ρ, Pur(u, r|ρ) is the conditional probability of selecting user
u and resource r when rule ρ and resource r have been selected; for sanity, we require Pur(u, r|ρ) = 0 if
u 6|= uae(ρ) ∨ r 6|= rae(ρ) ∨ 〈u, r〉 6|= con(ρ). The algorithm generates each log entry as follows: select a rule
ρ based on Prule(ρ), select an operation o based on Pop(o|ρ) and a user-permission tuple 〈u, r〉 based on
Pur(u, r|ρ), and then create a log entry 〈u, r, o, i〉, where the unique identifier i is the index of this log entry
in the synthetic log.
For convenience, we allow the user to specify probability distributions Puser(u), Pres(r), and P
′
op(o) instead
of Pur and Pop, and we compute Pur and Pop from them as described below; intuitively, the probability
associated with invalid values is distributed uniformly among the valid values by this computation. These
alternative probability distributions provide less detailed control but are simpler and more convenient.
Pur(u, r|ρ) =
{
c−1Puser(u)Pres(r) if 〈u, r〉 ∈ [[ρ]]ur
0 otherwise
where c =
∑
〈u,r〉∈[[ρ]]ur
Puser(u)Pres(r)
Pop(o|ρ) =
{
c−1P ′op(o) if o ∈ ops(ρ)
0 otherwise
where c =
∑
o∈ops(ρ)
P ′op(o)
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where the user-resource part of the meaning of a rule is [[ρ]]ur =
⋃
〈u,r,o〉∈[[ρ]]{〈u, r〉}.
Log Summary Generation Algorithm. When the probability distributions give much higher probability
to some user-permission tuples than others, using the above algorithm to generate logs with high completeness
is very inefficient, because very long logs, with many entries for high-probability user-permission tuples, are
generated. Therefore, we adopt a different approach that takes advantage of the fact that our policy mining
algorithm is insensitive to the order of log entries and depends only on the frequency of each user-permission
tuple in the log. Specifically, instead of generating logs, we directly generate log summaries, which are
simply sets of user-permission tuples with associated frequencies that sum to 1 (in other words, a log
summary defines a set of user-permission tuples and a frequency function). For a given ABAC policy and
probability distributions, we generate a log summary with completeness 1 using a program that computes the
asymptotic frequency with which each tuple in UP0 would appear in an infinitely long log generated using
the above algorithm. To generate a series of log summaries with varying completeness, we start with the log
summary with completeness 1 and repeatedly apply the following procedure that generates a log summary
of lower completeness from a log summary with higher completeness: select the appropriate number of
user-permission tuples from the latter, with the selection probability for each tuple equal to its associated
frequency, and then normalize the frequencies of the selected tuples so they sum to 1.
Probability Distributions. An important characteristic of the probability distributions used in synthetic
log and log summary generation is the ratio between the most frequent (i.e., most likely) and least frequent
items of each type (rule, user, etc.). For case studies with manually written attribute data, we manually
created probability distributions in which this ratio ranges from about 3 to 6. For case studies with synthetic
data and synthetic policies, we generated probability distributions in which this ratio is 25 for rules, 25 for
resources, 3 for users, and 3 for operations (the ratio for operations has little impact, because it is relevant
only when multiple operations appear in the same rule, which is uncommon).
6.3 Metrics
For each case study and each associated attribute dataset (manually written or synthetic), we generate a
synthetic operation log using the algorithm in Section 6.2 and then run our ABAC policy mining algorithms.
We evaluate the effectiveness of each algorithm by comparing the generated ABAC policy to the original
ABAC policy, using the metrics described below.
Syntactic Similarity. Jaccard similarity of sets is J(S1, S2) = |S1 ∩ S2| / |S1 ∪ S2|. Syntactic similarity
of UAEs is defined by Susyn(e, e
′) = |Au|−1
∑
a∈Au J(e(a), e
′(a)). Syntactic similarity of RAEs is defined
by Srsyn(e, e
′) = |Ar|−1
∑
a∈Ar J(e(a), e
′(a)). The syntactic similarity of rules 〈eu, er, O, c〉 and 〈e′u, e′r, O′, c′〉
is the average of the similarities of their components, specifically, the average of Susyn(eu, e
′
u), S
r
syn(er, e
′
r),
J(O,O′), and J(c, c′). The syntactic similarity of rule sets Rules and Rules ′ is the average, over rules ρ in
Rules, of the syntactic similarity between ρ and the most similar rule in Rules ′. The syntactic similarity of
policies pi and pi′ is the maximum of the syntactic similarities of the sets of rules in the policies, considered
in both orders (this makes the relation symmetric). Formally,
Ssyn(Rules,Rules
′) = |Rules|−1
∑
ρ∈Rules
min({Ssyn(ρ, ρ′) | ρ′ ∈ Rules ′}))
Ssyn(pi, pi
′) = max(Ssyn(rules(pi), rules(pi′)), Ssyn(rules(pi′), rules(pi)))
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Syntactic similarity ranges from 0 (completely different) to 1 (identical). High syntactic similarity between
the original and generated ABAC policies is not always desirable, e.g., for synthetic policies, which tend to
have unnecessarily complicated rules.
Semantic Similarity. Semantic similarity measures the similarity of the entitlements granted by two
policies. The semantic similarity of policies pi and pi′ is defined by J([[pi]] , [[pi′]]). Semantic similarity ranges
from 0 (completely different) to 1 (identical).
Fractions of Under-Assignments and Over-Assignments. To characterize the semantic differences
between an original ABAC policy pi0 and a mined policy pi in a way that distinguishes under-assignments
and over-assignments, we compute the fraction of over-assignments and the fraction of under-assignments,
defined by | [[pi]] \ [[pi0]] | / | [[pi]] | and | [[pi0]] \ [[pi]] | / | [[pi]] |, respectively.
6.4 Noise
We consider two kinds of noise: permission noise in form of over-assignments (i.e., incorrectly granted
permissions), and attribute noise. We do not consider under-assignments (i.e., absence of permissions that
should be granted), because introducing under-assignments is equivalent to decreasing the log completeness.
To evaluate the effectiveness of our noise detection techniques in the presence of over-assignment noise
with level νo and attribute noise with level νa, we start with an ABAC policy, change attribute values until
the validity of νa|UP0| user-permission tuples is changed, generate a synthetic log summary from the given
ABAC rules and the modified attribute data, with the log summary generation algorithm modified to reflect
that each log entry has a probability νo of embodying an over-assignment instead of a valid user-permission
tuple, and then apply our policy mining algorithm to the resulting log summary and the modified attribute
data. The over-assignments are invalid user-permission tuples generated according to the same probability
distributions used in synthetic log generation. The changed attribute values are divided equally between
missing values (i.e., replace a non-bottom value with bottom) and incorrect values (i.e., replace a non-bottom
value with another non-bottom value).
Our current noise detection technique does not attempt to distinguish over-assignment noise from at-
tribute noise (this is a topic for future research); policy analysts are responsible for determining whether
a reported suspected error is due to an incorrect permission, an incorrect or missing attribute value, or a
false alarm. Therefore, when comparing actual over-assignments to reported suspected over-assignments,
permission changes due to attribute noise (i.e., changes in the set of user-permission tuples that satisfy the
policy rules) are included in the actual noise.
7 Experimental Results
This section presents experimental results using an implementation of our algorithm in Java. The imple-
mentation, case studies, and synthetic policies used in the experiments are available at http://www.cs.
stonybrook.edu/~stoller/.
Over-Assignment Weight. The optimal choice for the over-assignment weights wo and w
′
o in the policy
quality and rule quality metrics, respectively, depends on the log completeness. When log completeness
is higher, fewer over-assignments are desired, and larger over-assignments weights give better results. In
experiments, we take wo = 50c− 15 and w′o = wo/10, where c is log completeness. In a production setting,
the exact log completeness would be unknown, but a rough estimate suffices, because our algorithm’s results
are robust to error in this estimate. For example, for case studies with manually written attribute data, when
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the actual log completeness is 80%, and the estimated completeness used to compute wo varies from 70%
to 90%, the semantic similarity of the original and mined policies varies by 0.04, 0.02, and 0 for university,
healthcare, and project management, respectively.
Experimental Results. Figure 6 shows results from our algorithm. In each graph, curves are shown
for the university, healthcare, and project management case studies with synthetic attribute data with N
equal to 6, 10, and 10, respectively (average over results for 10 synthetic datasets, with 1 synthetic log per
synthetic dataset), the online video case study with manually written attribute data (average over results
for 10 synthetic logs), and synthetic policies with Nrule = 20 (average over results for 10 synthetic policies,
with 1 synthetic log per policy). Error bars show standard deviation. Running time is at most 12 sec for
each problem instance in our experiments.
For log completeness 100%, all four case study policies are reconstructed exactly (i.e., syntactic similarity
and semantic similarity are 1), and the semantics of synthetic policies is reconstructed almost exactly: the
semantic similarity is 0.99. This is a non-trivial result, especially for the case studies: an algorithm could
easily generate a policy with over-assignments or more complex rules. As expected, the results get worse
as log completeness decreases. When evaluating the results, it is important to consider what levels of log
completeness are likely to be encountered in practice. One datapoint comes from Molloy et al.’s work on
role mining from real logs [MPC12]. For the experiments in [MPC12, Tables 4 and 6], the actual policy is
not known, but their algorithm produces policies with 0.52% or fewer over-assignments relative to UP(L),
and they interpret this as a good result, suggesting that they consider the log completeness to be near 99%.
Based on this, we consider our experiments with log completeness below 90% to be severe stress tests, and
results for log completeness 90% and higher to be more representative of typical results in practice.
Syntactic similarity for all four case studies is above 0.91 for log completeness 60% or higher, and is
above 0.94 for log completeness 70% or higher. Syntactic similarity is lower for synthetic policies, but this is
actually a good result. The synthetic policies tend to be unnecessarily complicated, and the mined policies
are better in the sense that they have lower WSC. For example, for 100% log completeness, the mined policies
have 0.99 semantic similarity to the synthetic policies (i.e., the meaning is almost the same), but the mined
policies are simpler, with WSC 17% less than the original synthetic policies.
Semantic similarity is above 0.85 for log completeness 60% or higher, and above 0.94 for log completeness
80% or higher. These results are quite good, in the sense that our algorithm compensates for most of the log
incompleteness. For example, at log completeness 0.6, for policies generated by a policy mining algorithm
that produces policies granting exactly the entitlements reflected in the log, the semantic similarity would
be 0.6. With our algorithm, the semantic similarity, averaged over the 5 examples, is 0.95. Thus, in this
case, our algorithm compensates for 35/40 = 87.5% of the incompleteness.
The fractions of over-assignments are below 0.03 for log completeness 60% or higher. The fractions of
under-assignments are below 0.05 for log completeness 60% or higher for the case studies and are below 0.05
for log completeness 80% or higher for synthetic policies. The graphs also show that the semantic differences
are due more to under-assignments than over-assignments; this is desirable from a security perspective.
Comparison of Rule Quality Metrics. The above experiments use the first rule quality metric, Qrul,
in Section 4. We also performed experiments using Qfreqrul and Q
ILP
rul on case studies with manually written
attribute data and synthetic policies. Qrul is moderately better overall than Q
freq
rul and significantly better
overall than QILPrul .
Comparison with Inductive Logic Programming. To translate ABAC policy mining from logs to
Progol [Mug97, MF01], we used the translation of ABAC policy mining from ACLs to Progol in [XS13a,
Sections 5.5, 16], except negative examples corresponding to absent user-permission tuples are omitted from
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Figure 6: Top: Syntactic similarity and semantic similarity of original and mined ABAC policies, as a function
of log completeness. Bottom: Fractions of over-assignments and under-assignments in mined ABAC policy,
as a function of log completeness.
the generated program, and the statement set(posonly)? is included, telling Progol to use its algorithm for
learning from positive examples. For the four case studies with manually written attribute data (in contrast,
Figure 6 uses synthetic attribute for three of the case studies), for log completeness 100%, semantic similarity
of the original and Progol-mined policies ranges from 0.37 for project management and healthcare to 0.93
for online video, while our algorithm exactly reconstructs all four policies. We used Progol 4.4 for these
experiments, because Progol 5.0 segmentation-faults whenever the posonly option is set. We also ran the
experiments without the posonly option using Progol 4.4 and Progol 5.0, and we obtained the same results.
Comparison with Author-Topic Model. Inspired by Molloy et al.’s translation of RBAC policy mining
from logs to the problem of constructing an Author-Topic Model (ATM) [MPC12], we developed and imple-
mented a translation of ABAC policy mining from logs to ATM. In our translation, (1) topics correspond to
rules, (2) authors correspond to tuples containing a user attribute expression, a resource attribute expres-
sion, and a constraint that can appear together in a candidate ABAC rule, (3) documents correspond to a
user-resource pair, and (4) words correspond to operations. We used Steyvers and Griffiths’ implementation
of the ATM algorithm, available at http://psiexp.ss.uci.edu/research/programs_data/toolbox.htm.
We did not implement the discretization algorithm based on simulated annealing to compute an ABAC pol-
icy from the generated author-topic model; we manually considered the top few authors for each document.
We applied this algorithm to the four case studies with manually written attribute data, using generated
logs with completeness ranging from 0.6 to 1 in steps of 0.1, and using 10 logs for each completeness level.
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In each case, we specified the number of rules in the original policy as the number of topics. In all cases (i.e.,
for all logs at each log completeness level for each case study), the semantic similarity of the original and
mined policies is below 0.6. The reason for the low semantic similarity is that the authors selected by the
ATM algorithm correspond to narrow rules, not general rules applicable to multiple projects, departments,
wards, or whatever.
8 Related Work
We are not aware of prior work on ABAC mining from logs. We discuss prior work on related problems.
Our policy mining algorithm is based on our algorithm for ABAC policy mining from ACLs [XS13a]. The
main differences are described in Section 1. The fact that our algorithm can be adapted to work well for this
new problem, without changing the algorithm’s overall structure, demonstrates the power and flexibility of
our approach.
Association rule mining is another possible basis for ABAC policy mining. However, association rule
mining algorithms are not well suited to ABAC policy mining, because they are designed to find rules that
are probabilistic in nature [AS94] and are supported by statistically strong evidence. They are not designed
to produce a set of rules that completely cover the input data and are minimum-sized among such sets of
rules. Consequently, unlike our algorithm, they do not give preference to smaller rules or rules with less
overlap (to reduce overall policy size).
Ni et al. investigated the use of machine learning algorithms for security policy mining [NLC+09]. In the
most closely related part of their work, a supervised machine learning algorithm is used to learn classifiers
(analogous to attribute expressions) that associate users with roles, given as input the users, the roles,
user attribute data, and the user-role assignment. Perhaps the largest difference between their work and
ABAC policy mining is that their approach needs to be given the roles and the role-permission or user-role
assignment as training data; in contrast, ABAC policy mining algorithms do not require any part of the
desired high-level policy to be given as input. Also, their work does not consider anything analogous to
constraints.
Gal-Oz et al. [GOGY+11] mine roles from logs that record sets of permissions exercised together in
one high-level operation. Their algorithm introduces roles whose sets of assigned permissions are the sets
of permissions in the log. Their algorithm introduces over-assignments by removing roles with few users
or whose permission set occurs few times in the log and re-assigning their members to roles with more
permissions. They evaluate their algorithm on synthetic logs. Their algorithm does not use attribute data.
Molloy et al. apply a machine learning algorithm that uses a statistical approach, based upon a generative
model, to find the RBAC policy that is most likely to generate the behavior (usage of permissions) observed
in the logs [MPC12]. They give an algorithm, based on Rosen-Zvi et al.’s algorithm for learning Author-
Topic Models (ATMs) [RZCG+10], to mine meaningful roles from logs and attribute data, i.e., roles such
that the user-role assignment is statistically correlated with user attributes. A discretization algorithm
based on simulated annealing is used to produce an RBAC policy from the probabilistic results of the
ATM algorithm. We adapted their approach to ABAC policy mining from logs as described in Section 7,
and found that it is less effective than our algorithm on the small examples we tried. Another issue with
this approach is scalability: the adapted algorithm enumerates all authors, and the number of authors is
very large, because authors correspond to tuples containing a well-formed UAE, RAE and constraint (i.e.,
tuples with the components of a candidate rule other than the operation set). In contrast, our algorithm
never enumerates all well-formed candidate rules; it constructs candidate rules by generalizing specific rules
constructed from seeds in the input. The number of authors is much smaller in Molloy et al.’s work, which
does not consider resource attributes, and hence an author corresponds to only a candidate user attribute
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expression. Another issue with this approach is that it requires specifying the desired number of rules, which
is difficult to predict.
Zhang et al. apply the experience-based access management approach [GLM11] for role evolution
[ZGL+11]. In particular, they use machine learning algorithms based on Na¨ive Bayes classifiers to assess
the quality of the roles in a given role hierarchy relative to given access logs. The quality is based on the
strength of the correlation between the user-role assignment and users’ access patterns. The analysis results
can be used to improve the role hierarchy. Zhang et al. also propose an algorithm based on Support Vector
Machines to evolve a role hierarchy [ZCG+13]. Given a role hierarchy and access logs, the algorithm tries
to generate a new role hierarchy that optimizes a policy quality metric based on both the distance between
the given policy and the generated policy and the homogeneity of the generated roles with respect to the
logs. Role homogeneity is a measure of the similarity of the access patterns of the members of a role. These
papers do not consider improvement or mining of ABAC policies.
9 Conclusion
This paper presents an algorithm for mining ABAC policies from logs and attribute data. Experiments with
case studies and synthetic policies demonstrate the algorithm’s effectiveness even when the log reflects only
a fraction of the entitlements. Although the original (desired) ABAC policy is not reconstructed perfectly
from the log, the mined policy is sufficiently similar to it that the mined policy would be very useful as a
starting point for policy administrators tasked with developing that ABAC policy.
Directions for future work include handling additional policy language constructs such as arithmetic
inequalities and negation, better automated tuning of parameters such as w′o, characterization of the algo-
rithm’s effectiveness as a function of input characteristics such as the ratio of frequencies of the most and
least frequent items (cf. Section 6.2) and the complexity of the ABAC policy (average number of conjuncts
per rule, etc.), and experiments with noisy logs.
Acknowledgments. Christian Hesselbach did the comparison with Progol.
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A Rule Quality Metric Based On Inductive Logic Programming
We review the theory quality metric used in Progol [MB00, MF01], a well-known ILP system, and then
describe our design of a rule quality metric based on it. Progol’s IPL algorithm works as follows. At the
outermost level, Progol uses a loop that repeatedly generalizes an example to a hypothesized rule and then
removes examples which are redundant relative to (i.e., covered by) the new rule, until no examples remain
to be generalised. When generalizing an example, Progol uses a metric, called a compression metric, to guide
construction of the hypotheses. When mining ABAC policies from operation logs, user-permissions tuples
in UP(L) are positive examples, and no negative examples are available. Thus, this corresponds to the case
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of learning from only positive data. When learning from only positive data, Progol’s compression metric
pcomp is defined as follows [Mug95].
fm(H) = c× 2−|H|(1− g(H))m (2)
pcomp(H,E) = log2
fm(H)
fm(E)
(3)
= |E| − |H| −m(log2(1− g(E))
− log2(1− g(H)))
≈ |E| − |H|+m log2(1− g(H))
where E is the set of positive examples, H is the entire theory (i.e., ABAC policy, in our context) being
generated, including the part not generated yet, m = |E|, |H| is the size of H, measured as the number
of bits needed to encode H, and c is a constant chosen so that
∑
H∈H fm(H) = 1, where H is the set of
all candidate theories (note that f , like pcomp is a function of H and E, since m = |E|, but we adopt
Muggleton’s notation of fm(H) instead of using the more straightforward notation f(H,E)). Let X be the
set of all possible well-formed examples (in our context, X is the set of all user-permission tuples). g(H)
(the ”generality” of H) is the probability that an element of X, randomly selected following a uniform
distribution, satisfies H. fm and pcomp can be regarded as policy quality metrics. The term 2
−|H| in the
definition of fm causes policies with smaller size to have higher quality, and the term (1 − g(H))m causes
policies with larger meaning to have higher quality. In [Mug95], fm is used to guide the search for rules.
Using pcomp to guide the search would have the same effect, because in the definition of pcomp in equation
(3), fm(E) is a constant, and log2
fm(H)
fm(E)
is a monotonic function of fm(H), so maximizing fm is equivalent
to maximizing pcomp.
A difficulty with using fm to guide generation of a rule to add to a partly generated theory is that the
entire theory H is not yet known. To overcome this difficulty, the quality of the entire theory is estimated
by extrapolation. Let Ci denote the i’th rule added to the theory, and let Hi = {C1, . . . , Ci}. Let n denote
the number of rules in the entire theory being generated (of course, n is not known until the algorithm
terminates). When generating Ci, the policy quality fm(Hn) is estimated as follows.
c× 2−(mp ×|Ci|) × (1− m
p
∗ (g(Hi)− g(Hi−1)))m (4)
where p is the number of examples in E that are implied by Ci and not by Hi−1.
Now we describe how to modify our policy mining algorithm to use fm as a rule quality metric. In the
loop in the top-level pseudocode in Figure 1 that builds the set Rules of candidate rules, rule quality is
computed using equation 4 with Hi−1 = Rules and Ci = ρ. Specifically, in the definition of generalizeRule
in 4, Qrul(ρ, uncovUP) is replaced with fm computed using equation 4 with Hi−1 = Rules and Ci = ρ. This
closely corresponds to the usage in Progol, although it is slightly different, because some of the candidate
rules in Rules will not be included in the final set of rules Rules ′.
In the loop in the top-level pseudocode in Figure 1 that builds the set Rules ′ of final rules, we take the
same approach, except using Rules ′ instead of Rules. Specifically, Qrul(ρ, uncovUP) is replaced with fm
computed using equation 4 with Hi−1 = Rules ′ and Ci = ρ.
To compute rule quality after building the set Rules of candidate rules and before building the set
Rules ′ of final rules, the algorithm is modifying a set of rules, not extending a set of rules, so fm can be
evaluated using equation 2, with Rules as an estimate of the entire policy H. Specifically, in the calls to
elimConjuncts and elimConstraints from simplifyRules, Qrul(ρ
′′,UP0) is replaced with fm computed using
equation 2 with H = Rules \ ρ ∪ {ρ′′}, and Qrul(ρbest,UP0) is replaced with fm computed using equation 2
with H = Rules \ ρ ∪ {ρbest}.
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